On 17 April 2025 bp announced that it had loaded the first cargo of liquefied natural gas from Phase 1 of the Greater Tortue Ahmeyim project, which straddles the maritime border between Mauritania and Senegal. The gas is produced from wells in water depths of up to 2,850 metres, about 120 kilometres offshore, processed on a floating production vessel around 40 kilometres offshore, and liquefied on the Gimi floating LNG vessel, 10 kilometres from the coast. Once fully commissioned, Phase 1 is expected to produce around 2.4 million tonnes of LNG a year. bp's partners are Kosmos Energy and the two national oil companies, Petrosen of Senegal and SMH of Mauritania. The governments have declared it a project of strategic national importance.
The start of exports is a milestone that has been a long time coming. The discoveries were made in the middle of the last decade and the investment decision was taken at the end of 2018, with first gas originally expected years earlier than it arrived. Our view is that the export cargoes are the least interesting part of the story. At 2.4 million tonnes a year, GTA Phase 1 is small in a global LNG market heading for a large wave of new supply from Qatar and the United States. What matters for the two host countries is whether the project's commitment to allocate gas to domestic markets turns into power stations and industry at home, and whether the revenue is managed in a way that avoids the familiar resource curse.
A small project in a crowded market
Global LNG supply is set to grow strongly over the second half of the decade as large expansion projects in Qatar and the United States come online. That wave is expected to soften prices from the elevated levels seen after 2022. A 2.4 million tonne project is a modest addition to that market, and its commercial value depends mainly on the contracts under which its output is sold rather than on its effect on prices. bp holds offtake rights, which means the cargoes will be placed within its global portfolio.
For Senegal and Mauritania, the export revenue is meaningful relative to the size of their economies, but it arrives in a market where the price outlook has weakened since the project was sanctioned. The fiscal planning of both governments should assume conservative prices and should not front-load spending on the expectation that the high prices of 2022 will return.
The domestic gas question
bp says that an allocation of gas volumes will be made available to the domestic markets in both countries when they are ready to receive it. That last clause carries a lot of weight. Domestic gas requires pipelines to shore, processing, and above all buyers: power stations, fertiliser plants or industrial users that can sign long-term contracts and pay for the gas.
Senegal has an explicit strategy built around this. Its gas-to-power plans aim to convert existing heavy fuel oil plants and build new gas-fired generation, reducing the cost of electricity and the country's dependence on imported liquid fuels. Mauritania has similar ambitions on a smaller scale. If domestic gas displaces imported fuel oil in power generation, the savings to the utility and the balance of payments could rival the fiscal value of the export revenue. That is where the developmental case for GTA really lies.
But domestic gas markets in West Africa have a mixed record. Utilities that struggle to pay for fuel oil will also struggle to pay for gas. If the national utility cannot guarantee payment, the upstream partners will prioritise exports, which are paid reliably in dollars. Senegal's power utility and its finances therefore matter as much to the project's domestic benefit as the upstream engineering.
Floating liquefaction also shapes the domestic question. Because the Gimi vessel sits offshore, there is no onshore LNG plant or gas hub around which a domestic industry can naturally cluster. Bringing gas to shore will need its own pipeline and processing investment, and someone has to pay for it before the first domestic molecule is sold.
Governance and contract renegotiation
Senegal's government, elected in 2024, came into office promising to review oil and gas contracts to secure a fairer share for the state. Senegal also began producing oil in June 2024 from the Sangomar field, so it now has both oil and gas revenue to manage. Reviewing contracts is legitimate, and many African states have signed agreements that later looked unfavourable. But the timing matters. Phase 1 is built. The decision on further phases, and on the size of any expansion, has not yet been taken. Investors will be watching how the review is conducted. A transparent renegotiation with clear rules is compatible with further investment. Abrupt changes to fiscal terms would make the next phase harder to finance.
Revenue management is the other half of governance. Both countries should publish the volumes and values of exports, the state's share and how it is spent. Senegal has a legal framework for managing hydrocarbon revenue, including a stabilisation and intergenerational fund. Using it consistently, rather than routing windfalls straight into the current budget, would protect the economy from price swings and build public trust.
What comes next
The partners have discussed further phases that could expand output significantly. Our view is that the case for expansion should be judged against the global supply wave and against the domestic market's readiness. A second phase that sells mostly into a well-supplied global market at lower prices is a weaker proposition than one that also feeds a credible domestic gas-to-power programme. The host governments have leverage in this decision and should use it to secure firm domestic gas commitments, with prices and delivery schedules, rather than general promises.
Our assessment
The first GTA cargo is an engineering achievement in very deep water and a political milestone for two countries that have waited a decade for it. But it does not, on its own, transform either economy. The value of the project for Senegal and Mauritania will be determined by whether domestic gas reaches their power systems, whether revenue is managed transparently, and whether the contract review strengthens rather than stalls the next phase. The export cargoes are the start of that story, not its conclusion.