Credit analyses published around Thar operators’ FY2025 performance sketched a national generation picture that deserves wider attention. Pakistan’s power sector generated 127,160 GWh in FY25, about six per cent below the reference target, against installed capacity reported at 45,888 MW. Hydropower led with 31.4 per cent of generation, nuclear contributed 17.7 per cent, local coal 12.2 per cent, and imported coal 7.1 per cent. The mix shows a system that can lean on low-variable-cost resources when water and nuclear availability cooperate, while coal still anchors a material baseload share.
Missing the reference target while carrying tens of gigawatts of installed capacity is the signature of Pakistan’s surplus-and-shortage paradox. Capacity exists; utilisation and payment do not always follow. Load factors at individual Thar plants moderated year-on-year in the same analyses, even as they retained priority dispatch on low energy prices. Receivables from CPPA-G remained heavy, proving again that kilowatt-hours generated are not the same as kilowatt-hours paid for.
For Transition Economics Institute, the FY2025 mix should discipline three debates. First, further imported-coal contracting looks harder to justify when local coal and hydro-nuclear already supply large shares and when dollar scarcity persists. Second, renewable policy must integrate with hydro seasonality rather than pretending solar replaces firm winter energy. Third, capacity payment reform should prioritise low-utilisation expensive thermal before touching high-value indigenous baseload.
Nuclear’s near one-fifth share is a quiet success of firm low-carbon energy. It also concentrates operational and fuel-cycle responsibilities that require steady governance. Hydropower’s leading share will swing with monsoon and reservoir management; planners should stress dry-year cases publicly.
Industrial users reading these shares want one thing: a lower, more predictable bill. Mix composition helps only if fixed charges fall and DISCOs collect. Celebrating indigenous percentages while circular debt rolls is nationalism without arithmetic.
September is a good month for an annual mix briefing that joins NEPRA, ISMO, and CPPA-G data into one reconciliation. Fragmented PDFs serve specialists. A single audited mix table would serve cabinet and consumers. FY2025’s numbers are good enough to build that habit on.
Institutional accountability remains the missing hinge. NEPRA, the Power Division, CPPA-G, the system operator, and the DISCOs each hold a piece of the puzzle, yet none owns the full cash-conversion cycle. Until reporting, incentives, and penalties are aligned to the same monthly cash target, reform statements will continue to outrun results. Transition Economics Institute will keep measuring progress by whether billed energy turns into settled rupees, whether fixed generation obligations shrink in line with the demand profile, and whether consumers see durable relief rather than a temporary rebate financed by another round of arrears.